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Abstract
This paper studies endogenous information manipulation in games where a population can
overthrow a regime if individuals coordinate. The benchmark game has a unique equilibrium
and in this equilibrium propaganda is effective if signals are sufficiently precise. Despite
playing against perfectly rational individuals, a regime is able to manipulate information in
a way that exploits heterogeneity in individual beliefs so that at equilibrium its chances of
surviving are higher than they otherwise would be. This result is robust to alternative payoffs
where the regime cares only for survival and to a number of alternative information structures,
including situations where individuals have access to high-quality private information that is
entirely uncontaminated by the regime.
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In coordination games, the information available to agents is a crucial determinant of equilibrium
outcomes. Typically, the truthfulness of that information is never in question. But when some
players choose what information to release, that information is likely to be biased.1 The optimal
amount of bias used by senders of information will depend on the way that receivers typically
filter their information. In many settings, receivers find it easy to infer bias from their signals
and information manipulation has no effect on equilibrium beliefs. In a coordination setting,
however, the way that an individual receiver filters information will also depend on the filtering
behavior of others. In equilibrium, senders may be able to manipulate information so as to exploit
heterogeneity in receivers’ beliefs and thereby affect outcomes.
∗This is an extensively revised version of a chapter from my UCLA dissertation. Previous versions of this paper
circulated under the title ‘Information and the limits to autocracy’.
†Department of Economics, Stern School of Business, New York University. Email: 〈cedmond@stern.nyu.edu〉.
I would particularly like to thank Andrew Atkeson, Catherine de Fontenay, and Christian Hellwig for their encour-
agement and many helpful discussions. I also thank Marios Angeletos, Costas Azariadis, Heski Bar-Isaac, Ignacio
Esponda, Stephen Morris, Alessandro Pavan, Andrea Prat, Hyun Shin, Adam Szeidl, Laura Veldkamp, Iva´n Wern-
ing and seminar participants at the ANU, Boston University, the University of Chicago, the Federal Reserve Bank of
Minneapolis, La Trobe University, the London School of Economics, the University of Melbourne, MIT, Northwest-
ern University, Oxford University, the University of Rochester, UC Irvine, University College London and UCLA
for their comments and suggestions.
1Important recent contributions to the study of endogenous information in coordination games include Angeletos,
Hellwig, and Pavan (2006, 2007) and Angeletos and Werning (2006).
1
This paper studies the use of biased information to manipulate outcomes in coordination games
of regime change.2 In these games, there are two outcomes of interest — either the preservation of
a status quo or its overthrow.3 I show that a regime with an interest in ensuring society coordinates
on the status quo may be able to manipulate information to achieve that outcome in equilibrium.
Section 1 outlines the model. Individuals with an interest in preserving the status quo are
treated as a single agent playing against a heterogeneous population of small agents. Each small
player can take either an action that adversely affects the regime or an action that supports it.
The actions of the small players are strategic complements. If enough people take the action that
undermines the regime, then it is overturned. As in Morris and Shin (1998) and similar models,
the ability of the regime to prevail is determined by a single parameter. Individuals are imperfectly
informed about this parameter and in principle may coordinate either on overturning the regime or
on living with the status quo. In this paper, however, the regime is endowed with the ability to take
a costly hidden action that influences the distribution of information. In the benchmark model,
this signal-jamming technology allows the regime to shift the mean of the distribution from which
individuals sample so that individuals receive information that at face-value suggests the regime
is difficult to overthrow. Rational individuals understand that their information is contaminated
by the regime’s propaganda and evaluate their signals accordingly.
This paper makes two contributions. I first show that this coordination game with endogenous
information manipulation has a unique equilibrium. I then show that signal-jamming is effective
in equilibrium when the intrinsic precision of the signal distribution is high. As signal precision
becomes increasingly high, so does the ex ante probability of the regime surviving. This suggests
that a regime’s propaganda apparatus will be more useful to it when individuals are receiving, from
a technological standpoint, intrinsically high quality signals. Perhaps the information technology
revolution may not be as threatening to autocratic regimes as is sometimes supposed.4
Equilibrium uniqueness is proved in Section 2. A key intermediate result is that, despite the
regime’s manipulation, in any candidate equilibrium individuals’ assessments of the probability of
the regime being overthrown are monotonic in their signals. This makes it possible to use ‘global
games’ arguments along the lines of Carlsson and van Damme (1993) and Morris and Shin (1998).5
In particular, it is possible to first show that there exists a unique equilibrium when strategies are
restricted to be monotone and then to show that this is the only equilibrium which survives the
iterative elimination of strictly dominated strategies.
2Cheli and Della-Posta (2002) study a coordination game where individuals’ signals are exogenously biased. By
contrast, this paper studies an equilibrium problem where the amount of bias introduced by the regime has to be
compatible with rational beliefs on the part of information receivers.
3The underlying coordination game employed in this paper has been used for many applications, including
currency and debt crises, bank runs, and political unrest. See, for example, Obstfeld (1986, 1996), Morris and Shin
(1998, 2003, 2004), Chamley (1999) and Atkeson (2000). See also Cooper (1999) and Chamley (2004, 237-267) for
textbook overviews with many additional applications.
4See Kalathil and Boas (2003) for a discussion of the conventional wisdom on the role of information in under-
mining authoritarian regimes. They argue that the revolution in communication technologies like the internet is
not likely to help in overthrowing such regimes.
5Carlsson and van Damme (1993) introduced the term ‘global game’ to describe coordination games of incomplete
information.
2
The effectiveness of signal-jamming when signals are precise is proved in Section 3. In equilib-
rium regimes are overthrown if their type is below an endogenous threshold. If a regime manipulates
it generates a signal distribution with an artificially high mean that is strictly greater than the
threshold. So if signals are precise, in this situation many individuals have signals suggesting the
regime will survive. And consequently it is rational for any individual, when contemplating the
beliefs of others, to assign relatively high probability to the event that they mostly have signals
near this artificially high mean. At the margin this makes any individual less likely to attack and so
the aggregate mass who do is relatively low. This in turn makes it more likely that the regime does
in fact manipulate and create an artificially high signal mean thereby validating the original be-
liefs. Two things are critical to this argument. First, different types of regimes must take different
actions so that there is uncertainty about the amount by which individuals should discount their
signals: if all regimes took the same action, it would be easy to undo. Second, individuals must
be imperfectly coordinated. If individuals were perfectly coordinated and information precise, all
regimes that could be overthrown would be overthrown.
The equilibrium uniqueness result contrasts with Angeletos, Hellwig, and Pavan (2006), who
were the first to emphasize endogenous information in global coordination games. Angeletos, Hell-
wig, and Pavan (2006) have in mind situations where a regime’s policy choice (e.g., a central bank’s
interest rate in anticipation of a speculative attack) provides an additional signal about the regime’s
type. Since individual strategies may or may not condition on the signal, this gives rise to both
pooling and separating equilibria. In this paper, however, individuals’ information is contaminated
by a behind-the-scenes choice of the regime (e.g., pressure on a recalcitrant editor or general) that
is commonly known to be possible but cannot be observed. Individuals have to disentangle the
truth from the effects of the hidden action. Signal-jamming games like this typically have fewer
equilibria than their signaling counterparts. For example, in Angeletos, Hellwig, and Pavan (2006)
a pooling equilibrium occurs if all individuals believe that the regime will not intervene, for then
the regime has no incentive to make a costly intervention. The regime is ‘trapped’ in an inactive
policy equilibrium where the regime merely validates the belief that it will not intervene. But
in this paper if all individuals believe that the regime will not take any action, the regime has a
powerful incentive to manipulate information so there can be no pooling equilibrium.
Traditional theories of strategic information transmission, such as Crawford and Sobel (1982)
and Matthews and Mirman (1983), focus on a sole information receiver. In this paper there is
instead a large cross-section of signal receivers. Since the incentives of the sender to manipulate
depend on the aggregate behavior of the receivers and since individual actions are strategic com-
plements, implicitly, each individual solves a filtering problem that depends simultaneously on the
solutions to the filtering problems of all other receivers.
Section 4 shows that results are robust to alternative payoffs for the regime that give it no direct
incentive to manipulate. Section 5 extends the model to cover alternative information structures,
including situations where some information is uncontaminated by the regime’s manipulation and
an alternate technology for the regime where its actions directly affect signal precision.
3
1 Model of information manipulation and regime change
There is a unit mass of citizens, indexed by i ∈ [0, 1]. Citizens are ex ante identical. After drawing
a signal (discussed below) each citizen decides whether to subvert the regime, si = 1, or not,
si = 0. The population mass of subversives is S :=
∫ 1
0
sidi. If a citizen subverts, she pays a fixed
opportunity cost p > 0.
The citizens face a regime indexed by a hidden state variable, denoted θ, that is the regime’s
private information. The type θ is normalized such that the regime is overthrown if and only if
θ < S. The payoff to a citizen is
u(si, S, θ) = si(1{θ < S} − p) (1)
where 1 denotes the indicator function. Individual actions si and the population aggregate S are
strategic complements: the more citizens subvert the regime, the more likely it is that the regime is
overthrown and so the more likely it is that any individual citizen’s best action is to also subvert.
After learning θ, a regime may take a hidden action a ≥ 0 that incurs a convex cost C(a)
where C(0) = 0, C ′(a) > 0 for a > 0 and C ′′(a) ≥ 0 for all a. I begin by assuming that the regime
obtains a benefit θ−S from remaining in power. The regime is not just concerned with remaining
in power but also wants to keep S small when it does survive. If θ < S, the regime is overthrown
and obtains an outside option with value normalized to zero. The payoff to a regime is therefore
B(S, θ)− C(a) (2)
where B(S, θ) := 1{θ ≥ S}(θ − S).
nature
selects θ
regime
takes a(θ)
citizens observe xi
form posteriors π(θ|xi)
take actions s(xi)
if θ < S regime overthrown
if θ ≥ S regime survives payoﬀs
aggregate mass S =∫
s(xi)f(xi|θ, a(θ))dxi
Figure 1: The timing of the model.
Following a regime’s hidden action a, each citizen simultaneously draws an idiosyncratic signal
xi := θ+a+εi where the noise εi is independent of θ and is IID normally
6 distributed with mean zero
and precision α (that is, variance α−1). So the density of signals is f(xi|θ, a) :=
√
αφ(
√
α(xi−θ−a))
where φ denotes the standard normal density. I begin by assuming that citizens have common
priors for θ and that this prior is the (improper) uniform distribution over the whole real line.7
The realization of the signal xi is informative for both the type of the regime θ and the hidden
action a. This action is itself informative about the regime’s type and rational citizens take this
account when forming their beliefs. In equilibrium, the action taken by a regime and the beliefs
of citizens will need to be mutually consistent. The timing of the model is shown in Figure 1.
6Normality is assumed for the sake of exposition. The critical assumption is that the support of εi is unbounded.
In previous drafts of this paper I dealt with more general continuous distributions. Details are available on request.
7I discuss informative priors and heterogeneous priors in Section 5 below.
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1.1 Equilibrium
A symmetric perfect Bayesian equilibrium is an individual’s posterior density pi(θ|xi), individual
subversion decision s(xi), mass of subversives S(θ, a) and hidden actions a(θ) such that
pi(θ|xi) = f(xi|θ, a(θ))∫∞
−∞ f(xi|θ, a(θ))dθ
(3)
s(xi) ∈ argmax
si∈{0,1}
{∫ ∞
−∞
u(si, S(θ, a(θ)), θ)pi(θ|xi)dθ
}
(4)
S(θ, a) =
∫ ∞
−∞
s(xi)f(xi|θ, a)dxi (5)
a(θ) ∈ argmax
a≥0
{B(S(θ, a), θ)− C(a)} (6)
The first condition says that a citizen with information xi takes into account the regime’s
manipulation a(θ). The second says that given these beliefs, s(xi) is chosen to maximize its
expected payoff. The third condition aggregates individual decisions to give the mass of subversives.
The final condition says that the actions a(θ) maximize the regime’s payoff. In equilibrium, the
regime is overthrown if R(θ) := 1{θ < S(θ, a(θ))} = 1 while the regime survives if R(θ) = 0.
1.2 Discussion of model
Regime’s payoffs. Conditional on surviving a regime obtains benefit θ − S and so has a direct
aversion to S. Regimes prefer to avoid a Prague Spring or a Tiananmen Square. There are two
distinct motivations for this. First, suppressing a riot is likely to be resource costly to the regime
and it seems natural for this cost to be increasing in the mass of rioters. Second, loosely speaking, a
benefit θ−S provides a simple way of modeling aversion to information generated by observations
of large S. For example, in a dynamic version of this model citizens would observe (possibly with
noise) the mass of people who have in the past attempted to overthrow the regime. The size of
previous attacks contains information about θ — in particular, low S is associated with high θ
— and so by keeping S low even when it will survive this period, the regime may have another
tool for convincing individuals not to attack.8 Section 4 below shows that the main results of this
paper go through when payoffs are instead determined by B(S, θ) = 1{θ ≥ S}θ so that the regime
cares only about survival.
Absence of free-rider problems. If a citizen is almost sure the regime will be overthrown she will
subvert and will not free-ride on others. Although this seems unappealing, a bad free-rider problem
is simply one of many factors that might lead to a high opportunity cost p. To see this formally,
suppose citizens get a larger expected payoff if they were actively involved in the downfall of the
8More crudely, observations of large S might be able to convince foreign powers that it would be easy to assist
the regime’s opponents it in bringing the regime down. The θ − S specification also facilitates comparison with
Angeletos, Hellwig, and Pavan (2006), ensuring that the information structure is the only difference.
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regime.9 Specifically, if the regime is overthrown a citizen gets random payoff w ∈ {w,w} with
w < w and Pr(w = w) := µ(si) with 0 ≤ µ(1) < µ(0) ≤ 1. That is, a citizen may free-ride but if
they do so they face a higher probability of being caught and penalized by getting only w. Then
if the utility cost of subverting the regime is normalized to 1 and a citizen believes the regime will
be overthrown with probability P (xi), she will participate if and only if
P (xi)[w − µ(1)(w − w)]− 1 ≥ P (xi)[w − µ(0)(w − w)]
equivalently, if and only if
P (xi) ≥ 1
(w − w)(µ(0)− µ(1)) =: p (7)
If p ≥ 1 it can never be rational for a citizen to participate in subversion. To make the model
interesting, then, we need:
Assumption 1. The opportunity cost of subversion is not too high: p < 1.
Intuitively, free-riding is less of a problem if the probability of being caught out is sufficiently
high or if the penalty from being caught is sufficiently severe. With this assumption, free-riding is
possible in principle but does not occur in equilibrium.
Interpretation of hidden actions. The hidden action a ≥ 0 of the regime gives it the ability to choose
the common component of individual beliefs and the potential to bias the information that citizens
receive. If a > 0 citizens draw from a signal distribution that at face value suggests the regime will
be more difficult to overthrow. This represents a situation where it is common knowledge that the
regime is able to exert pressure on editors, force recalcitrant generals to stand on parade, etc — so
as to depict itself as difficult to overthrow — but where it is not possible to observe that pressure
or manipulation directly and it instead must be inferred. In Section 5 below I endow citizens with
informative priors for θ, thereby giving individuals extra information that is independent of a.
1.3 Exogenous information benchmarks
Two important special cases of the model are when: (i) the regime’s type is common knowledge, or
(ii) hidden actions are prohibitively expensive. In each case, citizens have exogenous information.
If θ is common knowledge, costly hidden actions are pointless and a(θ) = 0 all θ. The model
reduces to the coordination game used by Obstfeld (1986, 1996) to discuss self-fulfilling currency
crises. If θ < 0, any crowd S ≥ 0 can overthrow the regime. It is optimal for any individual to
subvert, all do so, and the regime is overthrown. If θ ≥ 1, no crowd can overthrow the regime. It
is optimal for any individual to not riot, none do, and the regime survives. If θ ∈ [0, 1), the regime
9Perhaps it is more likely that a citizen will secure an influential position in the new regime if she participated
in the overthrow of the old regime. Or perhaps retribution is exacted on those who are thought to have let others
take the risks in overthrowing the regime. See, respectively, Jackson (2001) and Frommer (2005) for discussion of
the retribution exacted on collaborators after the liberation of France and Czechoslovakia from Nazi rule.
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is ‘fragile’ and multiple self-fulfilling equilibria can be sustained. For example, if each individual
believes that everyone else will riot, it will be optimal for each citizen to do so and S = 1 > θ
leads to the regime’s overthrow and the vindication of the initial expectations.
If hidden actions are prohibitively expensive, a(θ) = 0 all θ and each citizen has private signal
xi = θ + εi. Because each citizen has a signal of the regime’s type, expectations are no longer
arbitrary. As discussed by Carlsson and van Damme (1993), Morris and Shin (1998) and subsequent
literature, this introduces the possibility of pinning down a unique equilibrium outcome.10 In this
equilibrium, strategies are threshold rules: there is a unique type θ∗ such that the regime is
overthrown for θ < θ∗ and a unique signal x∗ such that a citizen subverts for x < x∗.
Proposition 1. (Morris-Shin): The unique equilibrium thresholds x∗MS, θ
∗
MS simultaneously solve
Φ
[√
α (θ∗MS − x∗MS)
]
= p (8)
Φ
[√
α (x∗MS − θ∗MS)
]
= θ∗MS (9)
where Φ denotes the standard normal cumulative distribution. In particular, θ∗MS = 1−p indepen-
dent of α.
The first condition says that if the regime’s threshold is θ∗MS, a citizen with signal xi = x
∗
MS will
be indifferent between subverting or not. The second condition says that if the signal threshold
is x∗MS, a regime with type θ = θ
∗
MS will be indifferent. In the analysis below, I will say that a
regime’s hidden action technology is effective if in equilibrium θ∗ < θ∗MS = 1− p.
To understand the consequences of information sets that are a function of the regime’s manip-
ulation, we need to study a more difficult equilibrium problem where the regime’s manipulation is
not trivial and citizens internalize a regime’s incentives.
2 Unique equilibrium with hidden actions
The first main result of this paper is:
Theorem 1. There is a unique perfect Bayesian equilibrium. The equilibrium is monotone in the
sense that there exist thresholds x∗ and θ∗ such that s(xi) = 1 for xi < x∗ and zero otherwise while
R(θ) = 1 for θ < θ∗ and zero otherwise.
Details of the proof are given in Appendix A. The proof shows that (i) there is a unique equi-
librium when agents’ strategies are restricted to be monotone, and (ii) that the unique monotone
equilibrium is the only equilibrium which survives the iterative elimination of (interim) strictly
dominated strategies.11
10This result depends on a relatively diffuse common prior. See Hellwig (2002) and Morris and Shin (2000,
2003, 2004) for discussion of the possibility of multiple equilibria in coordination games when public information is
sufficiently informative. Public information is introduced into the model with hidden actions in Section 5 below.
11The proof strategy is similar to Carlsson and van Damme (1993) and Morris and Shin (1998) but details differ
because of the endogenous information.
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The unique monotone equilibrium. Let xˆ, θˆ denote candidates for the thresholds in a monotone
equilibrium and let a(θ|xˆ) denote a candidate for the regime’s hidden actions taking xˆ as given.
Because of the additive signals, x = θ+a+ε, a unit increase in θ and a unit increase in x perfectly
offset each other in terms of their effect on the regime’s desired action. Given this, equilibrium
actions will depend only on the difference12 θ − xˆ and can be written a(θ|xˆ) = a(θ − xˆ).
Taking xˆ as given the mass of citizens facing the regime is
Sˆ(θ + a) :=
∫ xˆ
−∞
f(xi|θ, a)dxi = Φ[
√
α(xˆ− θ − a)] (10)
Since the regime has access to an outside option normalized to zero, its problem can be written
V (θ) := max[0,W (θ)] (11)
where W (θ) is the best payoff regime θ can get if it is not overthrown
W (θ) := max
a≥0
[
θ − Sˆ(θ + a)− C(a)
]
(12)
Using the envelope theorem and the definition of Sˆ(θ + a) in equation (10) shows that W ′(θ) > 1
all θ. And since W (θ) < 0 for θ < 0 and W (1) > 0, by the intermediate value theorem there is a
unique θˆ ∈ [0, 1) such that W (θˆ) = 0. Using (11), the regime is overthrown if and only if θ < θˆ.
For θ ≥ θˆ, the actions of the regime solve
a(θ − xˆ) ∈ argmax
a≥0
[
θ − Sˆ(θ + a)− C(a)
]
, θ ≥ θˆ (13)
Threshold θˆ is found from
W (θˆ) = θˆ − Sˆ[θˆ + a(θˆ − xˆ)]− C[a(θˆ − xˆ)] = 0 (14)
Taking xˆ as given, equations (13)-(14) determine the threshold θˆ and the hidden actions a(θ − xˆ)
that characterize the solution to the regime’s problem.
Given the solution to the regime’s problem, a citizen with signal xi assigns probability P (θˆ, xi)
to the regime being overthrown
P (θˆ, xi) := Pr(θ < θˆ|xi) =
∫ θˆ
−∞
√
αφ[
√
α(xi − θ)]dθ∫∞
−∞
√
αφ[
√
α(xi − θ − a(θ − xˆ))]dθ
(15)
where the numerator uses the fact that the regime takes no action for θ < θˆ. The most important
properties of P : R× R→ [0, 1] are:
Lemma 1. The function P is continuous, strictly increasing in θˆ and strictly decreasing in xi, and
for any xˆ ∈ R satisfies
P (θˆ, xi) = P (θˆ − xˆ, xi − xˆ) (16)
12Technically, the candidate action profile a(θ− xˆ) also depends on θˆ, but the only reason for keeping track of this
dependence is to demarcate the region where a = 0 from the region where a > 0. Since this is easy to remember, I
suppress the dependence on θˆ wherever this ought to cause no confusion.
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A citizen with signal xi will subvert the regime if and only if P (θˆ, xi) ≥ p. Therefore given the
solution to the regime’s problem as implied by (13)-(14), the signal threshold xˆ solves
P (θˆ, xˆ) = P (θˆ − xˆ, 0) = p (17)
To calculate a monotone equilibrium, we first solve the decision problem in (13) for arbitrary xˆ, θˆ.
This gives a family of hidden actions a(θ − xˆ) which can be used to construct the P function in
(15). Since P is continuous and strictly increasing in θˆ with P (−∞, 0) = 0 and P (∞, 0) = 1, there
is a unique difference θ∗ − x∗ ∈ R such that P (θ∗ − x∗, 0) = p. This solution can be plugged into
(14) to obtain a unique threshold θ∗ ∈ [0, 1) so that we know both θ∗ and x∗ ∈ R separately. The
equilibrium hidden actions are then a(θ) := a(θ − x∗).
Iterative elimination of dominated strategies. We can now go on to show that there is no other
equilibrium. From Lemma 1, there exist unique signals x < x such that
P (0, x) = p = P (1, x) (18)
Since p ∈ (0, 1) and P is continuous with P (0,∞) = 0 and P (1,−∞) = 1 both x and x are finite.
Any citizen with a sufficiently low signal xi < x has posterior Pr(θ < 0|xi) > p and finds it strictly
dominant to subvert the regime. Similarly, any citizen with a sufficiently high signal xi > x has
posterior Pr(θ < 1|xi) < p and finds it strictly dominant to not subvert the regime.
Now suppose that almost all citizens subvert the regime if and only if they have signals x < xˆ.
Then (13) and (14) determine a threshold θˆ and hidden actions a(θ − xˆ). In this situation, the
expected gain from subverting to a citizen with signal xi is P (θˆ − xˆ, xi − xˆ) − p. Since P is
continuous and strictly decreasing in xi with P (θˆ− xˆ,−∞) = 1 and P (θˆ− xˆ,∞) = 0 for any θˆ− xˆ,
for each xˆ ∈ R there is a unique signal ψ(xˆ) such that
P (θˆ − xˆ, ψ(xˆ)− xˆ) = p (19)
where θˆ implicitly depends on xˆ from (13) and (14). When other citizens subvert the regime if
and only if they have signals x < xˆ, a citizen with xi finds it optimal to subvert the regime if and
only if they have xi < ψ(xˆ). The most important properties of ψ : R→ R are:
Lemma 2. The function ψ is continuous and has a single fixed point x∗ = ψ(x∗) with ψ′(x∗) ∈
(0, 1). Moreover ψ(xˆ) < x∗ for all xˆ < x∗ and ψ(xˆ) > x∗ for all xˆ > x∗.
We can now use ψ to iteratively eliminate strictly dominated strategies.13 We build up a sequence
{xn}∞n=0 by iterating on ψ starting from the initial condition x0 := x. Since ψ is continuous, has a
unique fixed point x∗ = ψ(x∗) with ψ′(x∗) ∈ (0, 1) and ψ(xn) < x∗ for all xn < x∗, this sequence is
strictly monotone increasing, bounded above by x∗ and converges to x∗ in the limit. Similarly, the
sequence {xn}∞n=0 obtained by iterating on ψ starting from x0 := x is strictly monotone decreasing,
bounded below by x∗ and converges to x∗ in the limit.
13Given the properties of ψ as listed in Lemma 2, the remaining arguments are standard in the literature [Morris
and Shin (1998, 2003) or for a textbook discussion Chamley (2004)]. They are outlined here for completeness.
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Intuitively, these sequences represent the elimination of strictly dominated strategies ‘from
below’ and ‘from above’. For example, even if no-one else subverts the regime, a citizen with
signal xi < x1 = ψ(x0) will find it optimal to subvert the regime. Therefore all citizens with
signals x < x1 have s(x) = 1. But if so, all citizens with signals less than x2 = ψ(x1) also find it
optimal to subvert the regime. And so on. After n iterations, the only candidates for a citizen’s
equilibrium strategy all have the property that s(xi) = 1 for xi < xn and similarly s(xi) = 0 for
xi > xn with s(xi) arbitrary for xi ∈ [xn, xn]. In the limit as n → ∞, the only strategy that
survives the elimination of strictly dominated strategies is the one with s(xi) = 1 for xi < x
∗ and
s(xi) = 0 otherwise. In short, the unique monotone equilibrium is the only equilibrium.
2.1 Discussion
Signaling vs. signal-jamming. Theorem 1 contrasts with Angeletos, Hellwig, and Pavan (2006),
who were the first to emphasize endogenous information in a global games context. In their
model, individuals get one noisy observation of θ plus one observation of a signal a chosen at
cost C(a) by the regime which may also be informative for θ. Individual strategies s(xi, a) may
condition on a. In this signaling game, there is typically an uninformative pooling equilibrium and
many separating equilibria. For example, if each individual expects no manipulation, individual
strategies and hence the aggregate mass S will be independent of a. Given this, the regime has no
incentive to manipulate and so validates the original expectation.
In this paper, individuals get one noisy observation of the sum θ + a and so cannot condition
their strategies on a. Loosely speaking, signal-jamming games like this typically have fewer equi-
libria than the corresponding signaling game because there is less freedom to specify the signal
receiver’s beliefs about θ. For example, in this paper the impossibility of conditioning on a almost
immediately rules out the existence of a perfectly pooled equilibrium: to see why, suppose that all
individuals believe that no manipulation takes place. The best payoff a regime can get if it is not
overthrown W (θ) is strictly increasing in θ and there is a unique θˆ ∈ [0, 1) such that the regime is
overthrown for all θ < θˆ [as in equation (12) above]. Each regime θ ≥ θˆ will have an incentive to
take an action a(θ) ≥ 0 (strictly positive if C ′(0) is not too large). If so, rational individuals will
not believe that no manipulation takes place and there cannot be a pooling equilibrium.
Apart from questions of equilibrium uniqueness, the presence of a signal-jamming technology
also raises the issue of whether the signal sender, the regime, is effective in its goal of deterring
citizens from participating. This parallels the debate in the industrial organization literature on
limit pricing and entry deterrence. In Milgrom and Roberts (1982) an incumbent firm may price
below its static monopoly price to signal that it has low costs in the hope of deterring entry. This
game has a pooling equilibrium and many separating equilibria where the incumbent’s price is
indeed below its monopoly price but where limit pricing is ineffective in that a rational entrant
correctly infers the incumbent’s costs from its price and so enters exactly when it would if the
incumbent’s costs were observable. By contrast, Matthews and Mirman (1983) study a signal-
jamming problem where the entrant observes the incumbent’s price with noise. They show there is
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often a unique equilibrium and that it exhibits both limit pricing and successful entry deterrence.14
Imperfectly coordinated signal receivers. In traditional models of strategic information transmis-
sion like Crawford and Sobel (1982) and Matthews and Mirman (1983) there is one sender and
one receiver. But in this paper and in Angeletos, Hellwig, and Pavan (2006) there is a large
cross-section of signal receivers. Since the incentives of the sender to manipulate depend on the
aggregate behavior of the receivers and since individual actions are strategic complements, im-
plicitly, each individual receiver’s filtering problem depends simultaneously on the solution to the
filtering problem of all other receivers. If some citizens believe the regime is manipulating, they
will conclude that the regime will survive (since only regimes with θ ≥ θ∗ actively manipulate)
and will not subvert. Because of the strategic complementarity, this will make other individuals
less likely to subvert.
That receivers are imperfectly coordinated gives rise to effects absent from the traditional
one sender/one receiver game. As discussed in Section 3.3 below, when precision is very high
and citizens are imperfectly coordinated, signal-jamming is maximally effective: as the precision
α → ∞, all the fragile regimes with θ ∈ [0, 1) survive. But if instead citizens are perfectly
coordinated then all the regimes with θ ∈ [0, 1) are overthrown.15
3 Equilibrium information manipulation
The second main result of this paper is that the regime’s signal-jamming technology becomes
more effective as the precision α increases. Section 3.1 prepares the ground by characterizing
equilibrium hidden actions. Section 3.2 and Section 3.3 show that signal-jamming can be effective
in equilibrium even when the regime is playing against rational citizens who internalize the regime’s
incentives. To give intuition for this, I first use a simple example with constant marginal costs
before turning to more general convex costs. Section 3.4 characterizes the equilibrium bias a regime
injects into individual beliefs.
Terminology. Throughout this section I draw a distinction between whether signal-jamming occurs
in equilibrium (when a(θ) > 0 for some θ) and whether it is effective. I measure the effectiveness of
signal-jamming by its ability to reduce the regime’s threshold θ∗ relative to the Morris-Shin level
of θ∗MS = 1− p (as in Proposition 1). A lower θ∗ increases the regime’s ex ante survival probability
by making it more likely that nature draws a θ ≥ θ∗. For high enough α the regime has θ∗ < 1− p
so that endowing a regime with a signal-jamming technology allows it to survive in more states
than it would in the Morris-Shin world.
I say that the regime benefits from lower θ∗ even though this does not necessarily increase the
regime’s payoff. In principle, it might be the case that lower θ∗ is achieved through large, costly
14See Wilson (1992), Riley (2001, 455-459) and Tirole (1988, 364-374) for further discussion.
15Similarly in Angeletos, Hellwig, and Pavan (2006) if agents cannot coordinate θ∗ can be any θ ∈ (0, θ∗MS] where
θ∗MS = 1− p < 1, but if agents can coordinate then as α→∞ regime change occurs for all θ < 1.
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actions that give the regime a lower payoff than they would achieve in the Morris-Shin world. But
it turns out that as precision α → ∞ and θ∗ falls, hidden actions also become small so that the
fall in θ∗ represents a genuine increase in payoffs, at least in the limit.
3.1 Regime’s hidden actions
In equilibrium, hidden actions a(θ) are characterized by the first order necessary condition16
C ′(a) =
√
αφ[
√
α(x∗ − θ − a)], θ ≥ θ∗ (20)
The marginal benefit of an action is the associated reduction in the mass of subversives and at an
interior solution this is equated to C ′(a). For signal-jamming to occur (meaning a(θ) > 0 for at
least some θ), the cost function either has to be either (i) strictly convex, or (ii) if marginal costs
are constant, C ′(a) = c all a, then the level of c cannot be ‘too high’: c <
√
αφ(0) =: c. If either of
these conditions is satisfied, then actions are zero for all θ < θ∗ before jumping up discontinuously
to a positive value at the threshold θ∗. As the fundamentals of the regime become strong, costly
actions taken to generate a favorable signal distribution begin to encounter diminishing returns
and the action profile dies to zero. Figure 2 illustrates.
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Figure 2: Equilibrium hidden actions a(θ).
Even if some regimes manipulate information in equilibrium, it is not necessarily the case
that the existence of the signal-jamming technology is to the regime’s benefit. To understand
when a regime does benefit from the signal-jamming technology, I first specialize to the case of
constant marginal costs. This example allows for explicit calculations showing that signal-jamming
is effective when the signal precision α is sufficiently high.
16The first order condition (20) for a(θ) > 0 may have zero, one or two solutions. In the event of two solutions,
only the higher solution satisfies the second order condition.
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3.2 Signal-jamming example: constant marginal costs
Let C(a) := ca for some constant c ∈ (0, c) where c := √αφ(0) so that a(θ) > 0 for some θ. Then
manipulating equation (20) shows that interior solutions to the regime’s problem are given by
a(θ) = x∗ + γ − θ, θ ∈ [θ∗, θ∗∗) (21)
where θ∗∗ := x∗ + γ and where
γ :=
√
2
α
log
(√
αφ(0)
c
)
> 0 (22)
In this case, the signal-jamming is particularly acute. All regimes that manipulate information
pool on the same distribution of signals. Citizens receive signals xi = x
∗ + γ + εi that are locally
completely uninformative about θ.
More precise information makes signal-jamming effective. In the absence of manipulation, higher
precision α makes signals more tightly clustered around the true θ? Does this kind help citizens
overthrow fragile regimes θ ∈ [0, 1) that survive only because of imperfect coordination? In the
Morris-Shin case, the answer is ‘no’: the equilibrium threshold θ∗MS = 1 − p is invariant to the
precision of the private information.17 With endogenous information manipulation matters are
even worse for the citizens: a regime’s signal-jamming is more effective for high values of α than
for low values.
To see this formally, use (21) and rearrange (14) and (17) to get
Φ[
√
α(θ∗α − x∗α)] =
p
1− p
[
c(x∗α − θ∗α + γα) + Φ(−
√
αγα)
]
(23)
and
θ∗α = c(x
∗
α − θ∗α + γα) + Φ(−
√
αγα) (24)
where subscript α acknowledges dependence on the signal precision. For each α > 0, these two
equations uniquely determine x∗α, θ
∗
α [solve (23) for the unique difference θ
∗
α − x∗α and then plug
into (24) to get θ∗α]. The equilibrium mass of subversives that makes the regime indifferent is
S∗α := Φ(−
√
αγα) = Φ
[
−
√
2 log
(√
αφ(0)
c
)]
(25)
The mass S∗α is strictly decreasing in α and S
∗
α → 0+ as α→∞. High α helps the regime engineer
a small mass of subversives. In turn, this means that as α→∞ all regimes with θ ≥ 0 will survive.
To see this note for large α solutions to equation (23) are approximately the same as solutions to
1{θ∗α − x∗α ≥ 0} = −
p
1− pc(θ
∗
α − x∗α) (26)
17See Proposition 1 for more discussion. The invariance of the state threshold to the signal precision is an artifact
of the assumption of a diffuse prior for θ. I test the robustness of my comparative statics results to informative
priors in Section 5 below.
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The only solution to equation (26) is θ∗α − x∗α = 0. So as α → ∞, solutions to equation (23)
approach zero too. From equation (24) we now know that θ∗α → 0+. Therefore, the signal-
jamming technology is effective when the precision α is large enough. For large α the regime’s
threshold θ∗α is less than the Morris-Shin level of θ
∗
MS = 1− p and the regime’s survival probability
is correspondingly higher.
Intuition for the result. Why does a higher α help signal-jamming regimes? If a regime manipulates,
then from (21), it generates a signal distribution with an artificially high mean that is strictly
greater than the threshold, x∗ + γ = θ∗∗ > θ∗. So if signals are precise, in this situation many
individuals have signals suggesting the regime will survive. And consequently it is rational for any
individual, when contemplating the beliefs of others, to assign relatively high probability to the
event that they mostly have signals near this artificially high mean θ∗∗ > θ∗. At the margin this
makes any individual less likely to attack and so the aggregate mass S who do is relatively low.
This in turn makes it more likely that the regime does in fact manipulate and create an artificially
high signal mean thereby validating the original beliefs. Two things are critical to this argument.
First, different types of regimes must take different actions so that there is uncertainty about the
amount by which individuals should discount signals: if all regimes took the same action, it would
be easy to undo. And second, as discussed below, individuals must be imperfectly coordinated.
From a technological standpoint, signals may be intrinsically precise (of high quality). But
this does not necessarily translate into reduced posterior uncertainty for individuals. The direct
effect of higher α is to reduce posterior uncertainty, but there is also an indirect effect through the
regime’s hidden actions. Suppose the regime’s policy was linear, a(θ) = a0(α) + a1(α)θ for some
coefficients a0(α), a1(α) (this can’t be true in equilibrium, but it’s instructive nonetheless). If so,
citizens would have normal posteriors with precision α[1+a1(α)]
2. Then if α→∞ but a1(α)→ −1
sufficiently fast, the signals xi have no local information about θ even when α is large. The example
with constant marginal cost has slope coefficient exactly −1 whenever a regime manipulates and
so in this case signals are locally uninformative about θ.
3.3 Signal-jamming: the general case
The effectiveness of signal-jamming when α is large extends to the case of general convex costs:
Theorem 2. As the signal precision α→∞ the limiting equilibrium thresholds and hidden action
profile are
lim
α→∞
θ∗α = 0
+, lim
α→∞
x∗α = 0
+, and lim
α→∞
aα(θ) = 0
+ for all θ
If in addition the cost of information manipulation is strictly convex, C ′′(a) > 0 all a, then as
α→ 0+ the limiting equilibrium thresholds and hidden action profile are
lim
α→0+
θ∗α = 1
−, lim
α→0+
x∗α = +∞, and lim
α→0+
aα(θ) = 0
+ for all θ
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So for high enough α the signal-jamming technology is maximally effective. Moreover, there is a
partial converse.18 If costs are strictly convex then for low enough α the signal-jamming technology
is ineffective in that θ∗ > θ∗MS = 1− p. If so, regimes would want to be able to credibly commit to
not use the signal-jamming technology.
To characterize signal-jamming in the general case, rearrange (21) to get an alternative implicit
characterization of the hidden actions
a(θ) = x∗ − θ +
√
2
α
log
(√
αφ(0)
C ′[a(θ)]
)
, θ ≥ θ∗ (27)
which is (21) generalized to arbitrary convex costs but at the expense of losing the closed-form
solution. By implicitly differentiating with respect to θ and rearranging, it’s possible to show
that a′(θ) ≥ −1 with strict equality if C ′′(a) > 0. But as α → ∞, regimes that manipulate
have a′(θ) → −1 so that signals are locally uninformative. Moreover, since generally a(θ∗) > 0,
the signal mean for a regime that intervenes is strictly larger than θ∗ so that signal-jamming is
effective as α becomes sufficiently large because each individual worries about a large number of
others drawing signals that suggest the regime is not going to be overthrown.
Numerical examples. With general cost functions the model cannot be solved analytically. Figure 3
shows θ∗α as a function of precision α under the assumption that C(a) := 0.5a
2 for three levels
of p. The higher the individual opportunity cost p, the lower the threshold and the thresholds
are decreasing in the signal precision. In these examples, the speed of convergence to the limit is
faster if p is high and slower if p is low. Regimes that inhabit a world where the individual cost of
subversion p is high may benefit most from a given increase in α.
Interpretation. These results suggest that a regime’s less overt propaganda apparatus (pressure
exerted on editors, generals forced to stand on parade, etc) will be more useful when individuals are
receiving, from a technological standpoint, intrinsically high quality signals. In equilibrium signals
may be very uninformative, but that is precisely because the regime is co-opting the technology
to its own ends.19 A regime will want to exert a strong influence over the media when the signal
precision is high enough.
Role of imperfect coordination. Disaggregated information is essential to the regime’s ability to
benefit from higher signal precision. To see this, suppose that citizens were perfectly coordinated
and able to act as a large agent of mass one who could force regime change for all θ < 1 (as
detailed in Appendix B). Suppose also that this mass receives one signal x with precision α that
18As discussed following equation (21) if the marginal cost at zero is too large C ′(0) > c :=
√
αφ(0), then the
cost of information manipulation is so high that the model reduces to the standard Morris-Shin game. When we
take α → ∞ this bound does not matter. When we take α → 0+ this bound will be violated. Consequently, the
second part of Theorem 2 deals only with the case of strictly convex costs.
19A clear example of a regime co-opting new technologies for propaganda purposes is the sponsored diffusion of
the cheap Volksempfa¨nger radio set in 1930s Germany. By 1939, 70% of households owned a set — the highest
proportion in the world at the time (Zeman, 1973, 34-62).
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Figure 3: In the Morris-Shin game, thresholds are θ∗MS = 1− p all α. With information manipulation,
large α implies θ∗α → 0+, so in the limit all ‘fragile’ regimes with θ ∈ [0, 1) survive. Solid lines show
the benchmark specification while dashed lines show the alternative specification where the regime
cares only about survival (see Section 4 below). In either case, better information increases a regime’s
likelihood of survival. All calculations use C(a) := 0.5a2.
is contaminated by the regime’s action. As in the benchmark model, for high precision the regime
receives almost no benefit from taking a costly action and a(θ) → 0 for all θ as α → ∞. But if
citizens are coordinated, they then know that x → θ and so attack if and only if x = θ < 1. If
citizens are perfectly coordinated, all fragile regimes with θ ∈ [0, 1) are wiped out. But if citizens
are imperfectly coordinated all fragile regimes with θ ∈ [0, 1) survive.
3.4 Equilibrium bias
Suppose that a citizen with signal xi was ‘naive’ and believed she lived in the Morris-Shin world
where no manipulation takes place. Her posterior expectation for θ would equal xi. As a simple
measure of any bias in equilibrium beliefs, let b(xi) denote the difference between the rational
expectation of θ and the naive expectation
b(xi) :=
∫ ∞
−∞
θpi(θ|xi)− xi (28)
If b(xi) > 0, the regime’s propaganda has successfully induced this citizen to believe that θ is
relatively high. Otherwise, if b(xi) < 0, this citizen believes θ is relatively low. The average∫
b(xi)f(xi|θ, a(θ))dxi = −a(θ) ≤ 0, so on average the population generally discounts signals.
Depending on α either (i) no-one is induced to believe that θ is relatively high, or (ii) there is
disagreement about whether θ is relatively high or not. If α is sufficiently high, the distribution
of xi is almost degenerate for any θ so the average b can only be non-positive if each b(xi) ≤ 0
for all xi. Alternatively, if α is sufficiently low, then the conditional expectation of θ is almost
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independent of xi and so there exist some xi who are fooled in equilibrium, b(xi) > 0. The top
panel of Figure 4 illustrates.
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Figure 4: Equilibrium bias: if signal precision is low, some citizens believe the regime’s propaganda and
have bias b(xi) > 0, but this does not happen if signal precision is high (top panel). While citizens on
average discount their signals, they may not discount their signals enough. There are many θ such that
a(θ) ≥ ∫ a(θ)pi(θ|xi)dθ for every xi (bottom panel).
Citizens on average discount their information in an attempt to filter out the regime’s manip-
ulation. But this does not mean they discount their signals enough. The bottom panel of Figure 4
shows the relationship between a(θ), which is the amount by which citizens should discount their
information, and
∫
a(θ)pi(θ|xi)dθ, which is the amount that someone with xi does discount their
signal. Critically, there are regimes with θ ≥ θ∗ that engage in more manipulation in equilibrium
than is believed by any citizen. Citizens ‘under-discount’ the manipulation done by fragile regimes
just above the threshold θ∗. Similarly, since a(θ) = 0 for θ < θ∗ and a(θ) → 0 for large θ, most
citizens ‘over-discount’ the manipulation done by either very weak or very strong regimes.
The model that delivers these results is stylized and it’s natural to question its robustness. To
investigate this, Section 4 extends the model to consider regimes that only care about survival.
Regimes still benefit from better information. Alternative information structures are covered in
Section 5: for some but not all of these structures, regimes benefit from better information.
4 Regime cares only about survival
Let the payoff to a regime be B(S, θ)− C(a) where now
B(S, θ) = 1{θ ≥ S}θ (29)
so that a regime cares about S only to the extent that a high S makes it harder to survive.
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Characterization of equilibrium. With these payoffs only fragile regimes with θ ∈ [0, 1) could possi-
ble have an incentive to manipulate. The mass of subversives is S(θ, a) = Φ[
√
α(x∗− θ−a)] and if
an action a(θ) > 0 is chosen, it is set at just the right level to ensure that θ = S(θ, a). Specifically
a(θ) = x∗ − θ − 1√
α
Φ−1(θ), θ ∈ [θ∗, θ∗∗) (30)
and zero otherwise. Any higher an action would incur a cost for no benefit. The upper boundary
θ∗∗ ∈ [θ∗, 1) is the unique solution to θ∗∗ = Φ[√α(x∗ − θ∗∗)].
Given a signal threshold x∗, equation (30) determines the action policy and the threshold below
which the regime is overthrown is determined by θ∗ = C[a(θ∗)]. This implicitly determines θ∗ as
a function of x∗. The action profile in (30) can then be used to calculate posterior beliefs for a
citizen with signal xi as in equation (15) and this implicitly determines a threshold x
∗ as a function
of θ∗. An equilibrium is calculated by simultaneously solving these two conditions for x∗, θ∗.
It turns out that as, in the benchmark specification, signal-jamming is effective when α is high:
θ∗α → 0+ as α→∞.
Constant marginal costs revisited. To provide intuition for this, it’s helpful to again specialize to
the case where C(a) := ca and to consider the case when α is large. Let x∗α, θ
∗
α and aα(θ) denote the
equilibrium objects in the benchmark economy and let xˆ∗α, θˆ
∗
α and aˆα(θ) denote the same objects
in the economy where the regime cares only about survival.
From (21) we have approximately aα(θ) = max[0, x
∗
α − θ] when α is large. But from (30) we
also have approximately aˆα(θ) = max[0, xˆ
∗
α− θ] when α is large. So if x∗α = xˆ∗α, then aα(θ) = aˆα(θ)
for each θ. The thresholds θ∗α, θˆ
∗
α are determined similarly: θ
∗
α is determined by θ
∗
α = caα(θ
∗
α) from
(24) when α → ∞ and if the regime cares only about survival θˆ∗α = caˆα(θˆ∗α) for any α. So again
if x∗α = xˆ
∗
α, then aα(θ
∗
α) = aˆα(θˆ
∗
α) so that θ
∗
α = θˆ
∗
α. But for either payoff specification for the
regime the signal threshold is uniquely determined by the citizen indifference condition (17) once
the hidden actions and state threshold are known. So for large α indeed x∗α = xˆ
∗
α and the entire
equilibrium will be approximately the same under either specification.
To further check robustness, I have solved the model numerically with strictly convex costs
and when α is small. Figure 3 shows θ∗α as a function of α for various levels of p. The qualitative
similarity between the model with the benchmark payoffs and the alternative payoffs is clear even
for relatively low α.
5 Alternative information structures
Until now, improvements in the quality of information were modeled as increases in the precision
α. But in the benchmark model there is only one kind of information and it is affected by the
regime’s action. Section 5.1 allows citizens to have clean sources of information uncontaminated
by the regime’s actions. Section 5.2 changes the technology available to the regime, giving it the
ability to manipulate the precision of signal information rather than the signal mean.
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5.1 Uncontaminated information
I first consider the case where citizens are endowed with a second private signal independent of the
regime’s a and then turn to the case of a public signal. This second exercise connects the model to
recent papers in the global games literature regarding the differential effects of private and public
information on equilibrium uniqueness.
Heterogeneous informative priors. Let citizens have two idiosyncratically noisy signals
xi = θ + a + εx,i
zi = θ + εz,i
(31)
where εz,i is normal noise with precision αz independent of εx,i which has precision αx. The zi
signals can be treated as heterogeneous priors and unlike xi are not contaminated by the regime’s
choice of a. This is equivalent to idiosyncratically noisy information on the hidden action, say
yi = a+ ξi where yi := xi − zi and ξi := εx,i − εz,i.
A monotone equilibrium consists of hidden actions a(θ), state threshold θ∗ and signal thresh-
olds x∗(zi) such that a citizen with xi, zi subverts if xi < x∗(zi). Unfortunately, it is difficult to
provide an analytic characterization of the equilibrium with both contaminated and uncontami-
nated private information, so the discussion below merely provides some numerical examples. The
key finding is that an exogenous increase in the precision of uncontaminated information αz may
still reduce θ∗. See Appendix C for details on the computations.
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Figure 5: As precision αz of uncontaminated private information increases, regimes near θ
∗ take smaller
actions a(θ) but diminishing returns do not set in at such low values of θ. Citizens give more weight to
their uncontaminated information so x∗(zi) is steeper: for low zi it takes a higher contaminated xi to
induce subversion.
Figure 5 shows the actions a(θ) and the thresholds x∗(zi) for αz = αx = 0.5 and for αz = 2.5.
As the uncontaminated information increases in quality, regimes with types larger than θ∗ take
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Figure 6: Thresholds θ∗ as function of precision of uncontaminated private information αz. In these
examples a regime may benefit even from an increase in the quality of ‘clean’ information. Equilibrium
thresholds are relatively insensitive to αz.
smaller actions. But when αz is high, diminishing returns do not set in so quickly: a(θ) is noticeably
positive for more θ. The right hand panel shows the corresponding thresholds x∗(zi); these are
decreasing because if an individual gets a low zi it takes a high xi to induce subversion. As αz
increases, x∗(zi) becomes steeper so that the zi are weighed more heavily and it takes, for example,
an even bigger xi to compensate for a low zi.
Figure 6 shows θ∗ as a function of the uncontaminated precision αz for various opportunity
costs p. The θ∗ are lower than the Morris-Shin levels 1− p so that signal-jamming is effective and
are decreasing in the precision αz of the uncontaminated private information. But compared to
the model with only contaminated information, the effects of an increase in αz on θ
∗ are small.
These examples are only suggestive of what can happen in equilibrium. But it is clear that
introducing uncontaminated private information does not necessarily overturn the results of Sec-
tion 3. A clean information revolution may still increase the survival probability of a regime.
Common informative priors/public signal. Let citizens have a public signal
xi = θ + a + εx,i
z = θ + εz
(32)
The realization of z is common knowledge and again is an uncontaminated signal of θ.
If no hidden actions are possible, the model reduces to a setup studied by Angeletos and
Werning (2006), Hellwig (2002), Metz (2002), and Morris and Shin (2000, 2003) and others. For
each z, a monotone equilibrium is a threshold x∗(z) such that individuals subvert if xi < x∗(z) and
a θ∗(z) such that regimes are overthrown if θ < θ∗(z). It is well known that if public information
is too precise relative to private information, there may be multiple monotone equilibria [see, e.g.,
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Hellwig (2002) and Morris and Shin (2003, 2004)]. If public information is too precise, there is
‘approximate’ common knowledge of θ. Hellwig (2002) derived a sufficient condition for a unique
monotone equilibrium in a game of this kind, namely αz/
√
αx <
√
2pi. In the discussion that
follows, I assume that this is satisfied.
What happens if the precision of private information increases? As αx → ∞ for given αz (or
as αz → 0 for given αx) the public signal becomes uninformative and we revert to the Morris-Shin
game with x∗(z)→ θ∗(z) and θ∗(z)→ 1− p independent of the realization of the public signal z.
If the quality of private information is sufficiently good, the public information z is irrelevant.
Metz (2002) characterized the direction from which θ∗(z) converges to 1− p as αx →∞. If the
parameters p or z are favorable to the regime, then θ∗(z)↗ 1− p but if the parameters p or z are
unfavorable to the regime, θ∗(z)↘ 1− p. Why? Both xi and z are informative about θ, but only
xi is informative about the role of coordination. Also, it is common knowledge that signals are
bunched around θ and that every citizen gives weight to their idiosyncratic signal in proportion to
its quality. Now consider an economy with high z (which suggests the regime is going to be difficult
to beat, since high z is correlated with high θ). For moderate αx, citizens will give some weight to
this public signal and will be less inclined to engage in subversion. So for moderate precision, θ∗(z)
is low and the ex ante survival probability of the regime is high. But as αx increases, the influence
of the high realized z diminishes because everybody knows that everybody gives less weight to z
when αx increases. In the limit, only the opportunity cost p matters and θ
∗(z)↗ 1− p. I refer to
this as the coordination effect from increasing idiosyncratic signal precision.
With hidden actions the coordination effect is dominant for low αx and θ
∗(z) is increasing in
αx if p or z is high but decreasing in αx if p or z is low. But the coordination effect is limited:
when αx is large, people ignore z and the effects of further increase in αx are almost nil. Now
recall the basic hidden action model with no public signal: the state threshold approached zero as
the idiosyncratic signal precision became large. So we expect for high αx, the existence of a public
signal is almost immaterial and the hidden action effect of information manipulation is dominant.
Figure 7 suggests that this intuition is correct. When primitives are favorable to the regime,
the coordination effect and the hidden action effect pull in opposing directions. The coordination
effect tends to drive the equilibrium threshold up and to reduce the survival probability of the
regime. But for high αx the coordination effect is irrelevant while the hidden action effect still
matters. In this case, the thresholds have a ‘hump-shaped’ look and asymptote to zero. But if
primitives are unfavorable to the regime, both the coordination and hidden action effects are in
the regime’s favor and reinforce each other. In this case, the threshold is monotone decreasing
and asymptotes to zero. If primitives are unfavorable to the regime, there is a large benefit from
information manipulation (this contrasts with the benchmark model where regimes with favorable
primitives benefitted more from a given increase in αx).
Uncontaminated public information does not undo the central message of the hidden actions
model. For high αx signal-jamming is effective, θ
∗ < θ∗MS = 1− p. Better private information may
increase the regime’s ex ante survival probability. But perhaps this is not the most interesting
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Figure 7: Thresholds θ∗ as functions of αx. Dashed lines show the thresholds when there are no hidden
actions. Solid lines show θ∗ when hidden actions contaminate the private information. If primitives are
favorable (say p = 0.75), the coordination effect identified by Metz (2002) and the hidden action effect
pull in opposite directions, giving rise to a ‘hump-shaped’ function. If primitives are unfavorable to the
regime (say p = 0.25), both forces drive θ∗ down.
comparative static. What if the precision of the public signal increases? Then we run into the
problem of multiplicity. For given αx, the inequality αz/
√
αx <
√
2pi will eventually be violated and
there are multiple monotone equilibria. In this case, we lose the ability to draw sharp conclusions.
What if both the precisions of the public and private information increase together? Then if the
bound on the relative precision of the public information is satisfied the analysis goes through
essentially as above. At a given level of the relative precision αz/
√
αx, the threshold may be
increasing or decreasing (depending on the relative strengths of the coordination effect and the
hidden action effect), but as the ratio αz/
√
αx becomes small the hidden action effect dominates.
5.2 Manipulating signal precision
Until now, signal manipulation entered in an additive way: xi := θ+a+εi. With this specification
the action shifts the mean of the signal distribution without (directly) influencing the precision.
Now let signals be xi := θ + εi with the precision of εi given by
β(a) := α
(
1
2
+ Φ(a)
)
, α > 0 (33)
With this specification, negative actions a < 0 are possible and we need to reinterpret the cost
function C. When a > 0, the regime sets a precision β(a) > α and when a < 0, the regime sets a
precision β(a) < α. Accordingly, I refer to α as the intrinsic precision of private information.
In equilibrium, hidden actions a(θ) are characterized by the first order necessary condition
C ′(a) = (θ − x∗)
√
β(a)φ
[√
β(a)(θ − x∗)
] α
2
, θ ≥ θ∗ (34)
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Figure 8: Equilibrium hidden actions a(θ) when regime can manipulate signal precision. For interme-
diate θ it may be optimal for the regime to ‘muddy’ the signal, a(θ) < 0, relative to the benchmark α.
For high θ it is optimal for the regime to clarify its strength, a(θ) > 0.
Actions are zero for θ < θ∗ before jumping discontinuously at θ∗. If x∗ > θ∗, the jump is down
but if x∗ < θ∗ the jump is up. Intuitively, if the regime has intermediate type θ ∈ [θ∗, x∗) then it
worsens the signal noise relative to α (it muddies the signal). Otherwise, if θ > x∗ then the regime
finds it worthwhile to clarify its position of strength and so increase the signal precision relative
to α. Figure 8 illustrates with parameters chosen so x∗ > θ∗ and the profile jumps down at θ∗.
Transparency. In related work Bannier and Heinemann (2005) and Heinemann and Illing (2002)
study higher signal precision (more ‘transparency’) in the Morris-Shin game by allowing the regime
to choose the individuals’ signal precision to minimize the probability of a successful attack. But
in their formulation the regime’s choice of precision does not depend on its type θ and so when
forming beliefs individuals can take this precision as exogenous. In Figure 8, a regime reduces
transparency in this sense if θ ∈ [θ∗, x∗) and increases transparency if θ > x∗.
6 Final remarks
The coordination games studied in this paper are deliberately stylized so as to focus attention on the
use of information manipulation as a tool for influencing equilibrium outcomes. In keeping things
simple, I have abstracted from issues that might play a role in the development of a more complete
model of information, coordination and regime change. For example, information accumulation
over time, non-simultaneous moves by groups of citizens and strategic communication between
individuals might all be important components of a richer analysis. Moreover, for some applications
it might be desirable to have several ‘large’ players with competing interests over equilibrium
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outcomes (for example, if one large player has an interest in the status quo while a rival large
player seeks its overthrow). In such situations, individuals beliefs and equilibrium outcomes would
depend on the interactions between several hidden actions each of which is trying to push beliefs
in a different direction.
A Proofs
Proof of Proposition 1. (Morris-Shin): Let xˆ, θˆ denote candidate thresholds. Posterior be-
liefs of a citizen with xi facing threshold θˆ are Pr(θ < θˆ|xi) = Φ[
√
α(θˆ − xi)]. A citizen with xi
will subvert if and only if Φ[
√
α(θˆ − xi)] ≥ p. This probability is continuous and monotonically
decreasing in xi, so for each θˆ there is a unique signal for which a citizen is indifferent. Similarly, if
the regime faces a threshold rule about xˆ it faces mass Sˆ(θ) = Φ[
√
α(xˆ−θ)]. A regime θ will not be
overthrown if and only if θ ≥ Φ[√α(xˆ− θ)]. The probability on the right hand side is continuous
and monotonically decreasing in θ, so for each xˆ there is a unique state for which a regime is indif-
ferent. The Morris-Shin thresholds x∗MS, θ
∗
MS simultaneously solve these best response conditions
as equalities. It is straightforward to verify that there is only one solution to these equations and
that θ∗MS = 1− p independent of α. 
Proof of Lemma 1. Fix a xˆ ∈ R and, for notational simplicity, write θ for the state threshold
and x for an individual’s signal. From (15), the probability P (θ, x) that an individual with x
assigns to the regime’s type being less that θ can be written
P (θ, x) =
A(θ − x)
A(θ − x) +B(θ, x) (35)
where
A(θ − x) := Φ[√α(θ − x)], and B(θ, x) :=
∫ ∞
θ
√
αφ[
√
α(x− ξ − a(ξ − xˆ))]dξ (36)
Since A′ > 0 and Bθ < 0, Pθ > 0 for all θ, x. But Px < 0 if and only if A′/A > −Bx/B. Calculating
the derivatives shows that this is equivalent to
H[
√
α(x− θ)] > −
∫∞
θ
φ′[
√
α(x− y(ξ))]dξ∫∞
θ
φ[
√
α(x− y(ξ))]dξ =
∫∞
θ
√
α(x− y(ξ))φ[√α(x− y(ξ))]dξ∫∞
θ
φ[
√
α(x− y(ξ))]dξ (37)
where H(w) := φ(w)/[1 − Φ(w)] > 0 denotes the standard normal hazard function for w ∈ R,
where y(ξ) := ξ + a(ξ − xˆ) is the mean of the signal distribution if ξ ≥ θ, and where the equality
follows from a property of the standard normal density: φ′(w) = −wφ(w) for all w. Now define a
density ϕ(ξ|x) > 0 by
ϕ(ξ|x) := φ[
√
α(x− y(ξ))]∫∞
θ
φ[
√
α(x− y(ξ′))]dξ′ , ξ ∈ [θ,∞) (38)
Then after a slight rearrangement of terms in (37), Px < 0 if and only if
H[
√
α(x− θ)]−√α(x− θ) > √α
[
θ −
∫ ∞
θ
y(ξ)ϕ(ξ|x)dξ
]
(39)
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Since the hazard function satisfies H(w) > w all w ∈ R and α > 0 it is sufficient that∫ ∞
θ
y(ξ)ϕ(ξ|x)dξ ≥ θ (40)
But since y(ξ) := ξ + a(ξ − xˆ), ξ ≥ θ, and a(ξ − xˆ) ≥ 0, condition (40) is always satisfied.
Therefore Px < 0. Finally, using the representation of P given in (35), we have that for P (θ, x) =
P (θ− xˆ, x− xˆ) it is sufficient that B(θ, x) = B(θ− xˆ, x− xˆ). From (36) and using the linear change
of variables ξ′ := ξ − xˆ we have
B(θ, x) =
∫ ∞
θ−xˆ
√
αφ[
√
α(x− xˆ− ξ′ − a(ξ′))]dξ′ = B(θ − xˆ, x− xˆ) (41)
Therefore P (θ, x) = P (θ − xˆ, x− xˆ) too. 
Proof of Lemma 2. Since P (θ, x) is continuously differentiable in x, an application of the
implicit function theorem to (19) shows that ψ is continuous. Fixed points of ψ satisfy x∗ = ψ(x∗).
Equivalently, by Lemma 1, they satisfy P [θ(x∗)− x∗, 0] = p, where, in a slight abuse of notation,
θ(xˆ) is the critical state in the regime’s problem (13)-(14). Since Pθ > 0 with P (−∞, 0) = 0 and
P (∞, 0) = 1, by the intermediate value theorem there is a unique ∆ ∈ R such that P (∆, 0) = p.
Applying the implicit function theorem to (13)-(14) gives
θ′(xˆ) =
√
αφ{√α[xˆ− θ(xˆ)− a(θ(xˆ)− xˆ)]}
1 +
√
αφ{√α[xˆ− θ(xˆ)− a(θ(xˆ)− xˆ)]} ∈ (0, 1) (42)
Since θ(−∞) = 0 and θ(∞) = 1, there is a unique x∗ ∈ R such that θ(x∗)− x∗ = ∆, hence ψ has
a unique fixed point, the same x∗. Now from (19), we have
ψ′(xˆ) = 1 +
Pθ[θ(xˆ), ψ(xˆ)]
Px[θ(xˆ), ψ(xˆ)]
[1− θ′(xˆ)] (43)
By Lemma 1, Pθ > 0 and Px < 0 and θ
′(xˆ) ∈ (0, 1) from (42). Therefore ψ′(xˆ) < 1 for all xˆ. To see
that ψ′(x∗) > 0, first notice that it is sufficient that Pθ(θ∗, x∗)/Px(θ∗, x∗) ≥ −1 where θ∗ := θ(x∗).
Calculating the derivatives shows that this is true if and only if
φ[
√
α(y(θ∗)− x∗)] +
∫ ∞
θ∗
√
αφ′[
√
α(y(t)− x∗)]dt ≤ 0 (44)
where again y(t) = t+ a(t) is the mean of the signal distribution from which a citizen is sampling
if the regime has type t ≥ θ∗. To show that this condition always holds, we need to consider
two separate cases: (i) where costs are linear, and (ii) where costs are strictly convex. If costs are
linear, then a(t) = max[0, x∗+γ−t] where γ > 0 [as in equation (21)]. Calculating the integral and
then simplifying shows that (44) holds if and only if −αγφ(√αγ)a(θ∗) ≤ 0 which is true because
a(θ∗) ≥ 0. Now consider case (ii) where costs are strictly convex. From the optimality conditions
for the regime’s choice of action we have that a(t) > 0 for all t ≥ θ∗ and
√
αφ[
√
α(y(t)− x∗)] = C ′[a(t)], t ≥ θ∗ (45)
Differentiating with respect to t gives
αφ′[
√
α(y(t)− x∗)]y′(t) = C ′′[a(t)]a′(t), t ≥ θ∗ (46)
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Using the associated second order condition shows that y′(t) > 0 for t ≥ θ∗. Since y is invertible,
a change of variables shows that (44) holds if and only if∫ ∞
θ∗
φ′[
√
α(y(t)− x∗)]a
′(t)
y′(t)
dt ≥ 0 (47)
Using (46) we equivalently have the condition∫ ∞
θ∗
φ′[
√
α(y(t)− x∗)]2
C ′′[a(t)]
dt ≥ 0 (48)
which is true since the integrand is non-negative. Therefore, Pθ(θ
∗, x∗)/Px(θ∗, x∗) ≥ −1 and so
from equation (43), ψ′(x∗) > 0.
Finally, ψ(xˆ) < x∗ for every xˆ < x∗ is proven by contradiction. Suppose not. Then by
continuity of ψ there exists x˜ < x∗ such that ψ(x˜) = x∗. By the definition of ψ in (19) this implies
P [θ(x˜)− x˜, ψ(x˜)− x˜] = p and so by Lemma 1 and ψ(x˜) = x∗ simply P [θ(x˜), x∗] = p. But by (42)
and the hypothesis x˜ < x∗ we must also have θ(x˜) < θ(x∗) and since P is strictly increasing in θ
we have
p = P [θ(x˜), x∗] < P [θ(x∗), x∗] = p (49)
which is the needed contradiction. Therefore ψ(xˆ) < x∗ for every xˆ < x∗. A symmetric argument
shows ψ(xˆ) > x∗ for every xˆ > x∗. 
Proof of Theorem 1. First, there is a unique equilibrium if strategies are restricted to be
monotone. To show this, first solve (13) for arbitrary xˆ, θˆ. This provides the family a(θ− xˆ) which
is used to construct the P function in (15). Then from Lemma 1 there is a unique ∆ ∈ R such
that P (∆, 0) = p. Plugging this value into (14) gives the unique θ∗ ∈ [0, 1) such that the regime
is overthrown if and only if θ < θ∗ and then the unique x∗ such that a citizen subverts if and only
if xi < x
∗ is x∗ = θ∗ −∆. The equilibrium profile of hidden actions is then a(θ) := a(θ − x∗). By
Lemma 2, this x∗ is the unique fixed point of the ψ function.
To show that there is no other equilibrium, we show that the only strategy profile for the citizens
that survives the iterative elimination of (interim) strictly dominated strategies is the monotone
strategy s(x) = 1 if and only if x < x∗. Recall that when almost all citizens subvert if their signal
is less than xˆ, a citizen with x subverts if and only if x < ψ(xˆ). Let x0 := x and x0 := x [as in
(18)]. Now generate {xn}∞n=0 from xn+1 = ψ(xn) and generate {xn}∞n=0 from xn+1 = ψ(xn). By
Lemma 2, ψ is continuous, has a unique fixed point x∗ = ψ(x∗) with ψ′(x∗) ∈ (0, 1) and ψ(xn) < x∗
for all xn < x
∗. Therefore, the sequence {xn}∞n=0 is bounded above, strictly monotone increasing
and so converges xn ↗ x∗ as n → ∞. Similarly, the sequence {xn}∞n=0 is bounded below, strictly
monotone decreasing and so converges xn ↘ x∗. After n iterations, the only candidates for an
equilibrium strategy all have s(x) = 1 for x < xn and s(x) = 0 for x > xn with s(x) arbitrary for
x ∈ [xn, xn]. In the limit as n → ∞, the only strategy that survives the elimination of strictly
dominated strategies is the one with s(x) = 1 for x < x∗ and s(x) = 0 otherwise. Therefore the
only equilibrium is the unique monotone equilibrium. 
Proof of Theorem 2. For each precision α, there is a unique equilibrium. I find a unique
solution to a constrained problem consisting of the original system of nonlinear equations plus a
set of constraints that govern the asymptotic behavior of the endogenous variables. But, because
the equilibrium conditions have a unique solution for each α, the solution to the original problem
and to the constrained problem coincide.
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The equilibrium conditions can be written
(1− p)Φ[√α (θ∗α − x∗α)] = p
∫ ∞
θ∗α
√
αφ[
√
α(x∗α − θ − aα(θ − x∗α))]dθ (50)
and
θ∗α = Φ[
√
α(x∗α − θ∗α − aα(θ∗α − x∗α))] + C[aα(θ∗α − x∗α)] (51)
with actions characterized by
C ′[aα(θ − x∗α)] =
√
αφ[
√
α(x∗α − θ − aα(θ − x∗α))], θ ≥ θ∗α (52)
Now let α→∞. The auxiliary constraints that govern the asymptotic behavior of the endoge-
nous variables are assumed to be
lim
α→∞
√
α(x∗α − θ∗α − aα(θ∗α − x∗α)) = lim
α→∞
√
α(θ∗α − x∗α) = −∞ (53)
If condition (53) holds, from (51) we have θ∗α = C[aα(θ
∗
α − x∗α)]. Similarly, if (53) holds, then
Φ[
√
α (θ∗α − x∗α)]→ 0 and the value of the integral on the right hand side of (50) converges to zero.
From (50) and (52), this requires
lim
α→∞
∫ ∞
θ∗α
C ′[aα(θ − x∗α)]dθ = 0
Since θ∗α ∈ [0, 1] and C ′[aα(θ − x∗α)] ≥ 0 and is uniformly continuous in α , this can only be true
if aα(θ − x∗α) → 0+ for all θ ≥ θ∗α. But then if aα(θ∗α − x∗α) → 0+, C[aα(θ∗α − x∗α)] → 0+ and so
θ∗α → 0+ too. Finally, if both constraints are to hold simultaneously for large α, x∗α− θ∗α is positive
and x∗α − θ∗α − aα(θ∗α − x∗α) is negative. For both constraints to have the same sign, x∗α can neither
diverge nor converge to either a strictly positive or a strictly negative number. So x∗α → 0+. Hence
we have found a solution to the constrained problem.
Now for the second part of the Theorem. Recall that for this part we assume strictly convex
costs. Let α → 0+ such that √αx∗α → ∞ holds. Then x∗α → ∞. Since θ∗α ∈ [0, 1], we have√
α (x∗α − θ∗α)→∞ and the integral on the right hand side of (50) must converge to zero. Hence,
by (52), aα(θ − x∗α) → 0+ for all θ ≥ θ∗α (the strict convexity of C is assumed here so that (52)
holds for all θ even as α → 0+; with constant marginal costs, this would not be true). But if
aα(θ
∗
α − x∗α) → 0+, θ∗α ∈ [0, 1], and
√
αx∗α → ∞, then (51) requires that θ∗α → 1−. Once again we
have found a solution to the constrained problem. 
B The role of coordination: regime vs. single agent
This appendix highlights the role of imperfect coordination in enabling the regime to survive even
when signals are precise. Suppose to the contrary that citizens are perfectly coordinated and receive
one x := θ+a+ε. Collectively, they can overthrow the regime if θ < 1. In a monotone equilibrium
the mass attacks the regime, S(x) = 1, if and only if x < x∗ where x∗ solves Pr(θ < 1|x∗) = p.
The regime now faces aggregate uncertainty. It does not know what value of x will realize. The
regime chooses its hidden action to maximize its expected payoff∫ ∞
−∞
max[0, θ − S(x)]f(x|θ, a)dx− C(a) = −min[θ, 1]Φ[√α(x∗ − θ − a)]− C(a) (54)
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Regimes with θ < 0 are necessarily overthrown in equilibrium and so never engage in costly
manipulation. For simplicity, suppose that costs are strictly convex, C ′′(a) > 0. If so, all regimes
with θ > 0 will choose some positive manipulation, even regimes that ex post are overthrown. The
key first order necessary condition for the regime’s choice of action a(θ) is
min[θ, 1]
√
αφ[
√
α(x∗ − θ − a) = C ′(a), θ ≥ 0 (55)
(As usual, there may be two solutions to this first order condition: if so, the smaller is eliminated
by the second order condition). An equilibrium of this game is constructed by simultaneously
determining a(θ) and the x∗ that solves Pr(θ < 1|x∗) = p.
Standard arguments show that taking as given x∗ the regime’s optimal action a(θ) → 0+ as
α→∞. Given this policy by the regime, the probability of overthrowing the regime Pr(θ < 1|x)→
1{x < 1} as α → ∞. Therefore, x∗ → 1. With arbitrarily precise information, the regime takes
no action and so x is very close to θ. The mass attacks only if it believes θ < 1 and since x is close
to θ attacks only if x < 1. This leads to the downfall of any fragile regime θ ∈ [0, 1). By contrast,
Theorem 2 tells us that if citizens are imperfectly coordinated then for precise information any
fragile regime θ ∈ [0, 1) survives.
C Heterogeneous priors: uncontaminated private information
Individuals have a second idiosyncratically noisy observation zi := θ + εz,i in addition to xi :=
θ + a + εx,i. An equilibrium consists of functions a(θ) and x
∗(zi) and a scalar θ∗ where a citizen
subverts if xi ≤ x∗(zi). In what follows, let fX(xi|θ, a) and fZ(zi|θ) denote the signal densities and
let aˆ(θ), xˆ(zi) and θˆ denote candidates for the equilibrium objects.
The posterior beliefs of a citizen with signals xi, zi facing a threshold rule about the point θˆ
and manipulation policy aˆ(θ) are summarized by
Pr(θ < θˆ|xi, zi) =
∫ θˆ
−∞ pˆi(θ|xi, zi)dθ∫∞
−∞ pˆi(θ|xi, zi)dθ
where pˆi(θ|xi, zi) := fX[xi|θ, aˆ(θ)]fZ(zi|θ). A citizen with signals xi, zi will then subvert if and only
if Pr(θ < θˆ|xi, zi) ≥ p. Given θˆ and aˆ(θ), this implicitly defines a marginal citizen with signal zi
by
Pr(θ < θˆ|xˆ(zi), zi) = p (56)
The hidden actions for the regime are aˆ(θ) = 0 for θ < θˆ and otherwise
aˆ(θ) ∈ argmax
a≥0
[
θ − Sˆ(θ, a)− C(a)
]
, θ ≥ θˆ (57)
where the mass of subversives is
Sˆ(θ, a) =
∫ ∞
−∞
∫ xˆ(zi)
−∞
fX(xi|θ, a)fZ(zi|θ)dxidzi =
∫ ∞
−∞
FX(xˆ(zi)|θ, a)fZ(zi|θ)dzi (58)
and the cutoff θˆ is determined by the indifference condition
θˆ = Sˆ[θˆ, aˆ(θˆ)] + C[aˆ(θˆ)] (59)
I solve this model numerically. I first guess values xˆn(zi), θˆn (say) and then solve the optimiza-
tion problem in (57) for the associated hidden actions aˆn+1(θ). I then use θˆn and the implied aˆn+1(θ)
to compute revised estimates of the thresholds xˆn+1(zi) from (56) and use aˆn+1(θ) and xˆn+1(zi) to
compute a new θˆn+1 from the single condition (59). I iterate until the process converges. More
details and Matlab code are available on request.
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